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Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5343
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3922
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2237

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJ: PERMREPS LUNCH DISCUSSION, APR 23, PART II

SUMMARY: PART I OF MISSION'S REPORT ON THE APR 23 PERMREPS LUNCH (SEPTEL) COVERED ITEMS OTHER THAN THE DISCUSSION REPORTED HERE ON ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE FIFTEEN, THE NINE, THE US AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY

1. DEPUTY ASYG PANSA SPEAKING FOR LUNS WHO WAS PRESENT BUT SUFFERING FROM A COLD SAID LUNS WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT TOOK PLACE AT THE MEETING OF THE EC-NINE FONMINS LAST WEEKEND. KRAPF (FRG) MENTIONED SOME SUBJECTS THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BUT HE SPECIFIED THAT NO DECISIONS WERE TAKEN. KRAPF, EXPLAINING THAT NO STAFF HAD BEEN PRESENT AND THAT NO DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN USED, SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPORT TO THE ALLIANCE ON THE MEETING. MENZIES (CANADA) REJOINED THAT THE PRESS IS BETTER INFORMED ABOUT EC-NINE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS THAN ARE THE
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ALLIES AT FIFTEEN.

2. DE ROSE (FRANCE) SAID HE WAS SURE THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE NO REPORT FROM HIS GOVT ON THE BONN MEETING BECAUSE IT WAS A

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PRIVATE GATHERING. HE SAID THE FONMINS FEEL THEY OWE NO
INFORMATION TO THOSE WHO WERE NOT PRESENT. DE STAERCKE
(BELGIUM) SAID HE FELT THAT KRAPF REPRESENTING THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE NINE SHOULD GIVE SOME INFORMATION AND SOME IMPRESSION OF
WHAT TOOK PLACE.

3. MENZIES RETURNED TO THE ATTACK, COMMENTING THAT IT IS ALWAYS
EASY TO ARGUE THAT SINCE NO DECISION WAS TAKEN AT A PARTICULAR
MEETING, THERE WAS THEREFORE NO NEED TO CONSULT. THE
FACT REMAINS, MENZIES SAID, THAT SINCE GERMANY ASSUMED THE
PRESIDENCY OF THE NINE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ONE REPORT TO
THE FIFTEEN FROM KRAPF. TO THE GERMAN AMB'S REBUTTAL THAT THERE
WAS SIMPLY NOTHING TO REPORT, MENZIES REPLIED THAT THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO HIM SUGGESTED OTHERWISE.

4. KRAPF AND DE ROSE THEN ARGUED THAT THE TIME TO INFORM THE
FIFTEEN IS ONLY AFTER THE NINE HAVE ACHIEVED A COMMON POSITION,
THAT IS TO SAY WHEN THEY HAVE TAKEN A DECISION, OTHERWISE IT
WOULD SIMPLY AMOUNT TO REPORTING THE SEPARATE VIEWS OF NINE MEMBERS.
THIS CONTENTION DREW ERALP (TURKEY) INTO THE DEBATE WITH A PROTEST
THAT CONSULTATION WITH THE FIFTEEN SHOULD OCCUR DURING THE
DECISIONS PROCESS, RATHER THAN AFTER A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

5. SEEKING TO RECONCILE THESE DIVERGENT VIEWS, DE STAERCKE
SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS A SOLUTION MIGHT LIE IN SOME SORT OF AN
INTERIM REPORT OR COMMUNICATION SO THAT THE NINE MIGHT LEARN THE
VIEWS OF THE OTHER SEVEN DURING THE DECISION PROCESS. HARTOGH
(NETHERLANDS) SUPPORTED THE DEAN'S IDEA AND TOOK SOME SATISFACTION
IN OBSERVING THAT WHEN HIS GOVT CHAIRED THE NINE, THEY HAD
A MEETING WITH THE OTHER SEVEN AFTER EACH MEETING OF THE NINE.
THUS, THERE HAD BEEN SOME BASIS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS NO
MATTER WHAT THE STAGE OF THE NINE'S DECISION PROCESS.

6. COMMENTING ON THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THIS ISSUE, I REMARKED
THAT THE IMPORTANT THING TO KEEP OUR EYES ON IS THE PROBABLE EFFECT
ON THE ALLIANCE OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES THAT HAVE BEEN USED OR THAT
MIGHT BE RECOMMENDED.
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7. DE ROSE SAID THAT RECENT DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE NINE HAD BEEN
ESSENTIALLY ON THE SUBJECT OF US-EC9 CONSULTATION, AND THAT THAT
WAS REALLY NOT A SUBJECT FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS IN ANY EVENT.
LUNS, FINDING HIS VOICE, DIFFERED WITH THIS VIEW. HE INSISTED THAT
THE QUESTION WAS NOT SIMPLY A MATTER BETWEEN THE NINE AND THE US
RATHER THE SITUATION OF THE NINE IS OF INTEREST TO ALL MEMBERS OF
THE ALLIANCE. BUSCH (NORWAY) AGREED WITH LUNS AND CAUTIONED ON
THE DANGER OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE.

8. DE STAERCKE, SPEAKING CAREFULLY, SAID THE AMBS TO NATO WERE
COMPETENT TO HANDLE SENSITIVE MATTERS, BUT SOMETIMES THE
POLITICAL DIRECTORS GENERAL IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE NINE HAD A
TENDENCY TO HOLD INFORMATION JEALOUSLY. DE STAERCKE REPEATED

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HIS SUGGESTION THAT THE PRESIDENCY OF THE NINE COULD USEFULLY
GIVE SOME INFORMATION TO THE NATO AMBS, POSSIBLY THE SAME
INFORMATION THAT SEEMS SO READILY AVAILABLE BILATERALLY, SUCH AS
IMPRESSIONS AND PERSONAL ANALYSES AS TO WHAT IS TAKING PLACE.
THIS OUGHT NOT BE CALLED "CONSULTATION", DE STAERCKE POINTED
OUT, BUT RATHER AS "COMMUNICATIONS". AND IT SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED
BY THE INFORMALITY THAT OBTAINS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND IN
PERMREPS LUNCHES.

9. ERALP, RETURNING TO THE THEME OF CONSULTING BEFORE A DECISION HAS
BEEN TAKEN, CITED THE DISCUSSION OF THE NINE'S
POSITION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THE APR 22 NAC ON CSCE.
BECAUSE THE NINE, INSTEAD OF CONSULTING, SIMPLY TOOK THEIR
POSITION AND PRESENTED IT TO THE FIFTEEN, AMB SHERER HAD TO
COME OUT AGAINST IT VERY, VERY HARD. WHY NOT AVOID THE EMBARRASSMENT
OF THOSE SITUATIONS, THE AWKWARDNESS, THE DIFFICULTIES THAT THEY
CAUSE THE ALLIANCE?

10. SVART (DENMARK) SAID THAT HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE MORE
CONSULTATION IS INSTITUTIONALIZED, THE MORE TROUBLE IT CAUSED.
HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE DECIDED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

11. DE ROSE THEN TRIED OUT A BIT OF "CARTESIAN LOGIC." HE SAID
THE QUESTION IS: "IS IT ACCEPTABLE THAT INSIDE THE FIFTEEN
THERE ARE OR WILL BE EIGHT WHO TRY TO BUILD A POLITICAL UNION,
WHICH IF IT IS ACHIEVED WILL MEAN A MORE INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP
AMONG THEM? IF THAT IS AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER
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MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, THEN WE ARE SAILING INTO SOME HEAVY SEAS.
IF THE NINE MUST CONSULT BEFORE THEY DECIDE, THEN THAT REQUIREMENT
WILL EITHER HURT THE NINE. HE SAID THAT IF ON THE
FIRST APPLICATION OF THE NINE'S EFFORT TOWARDS POLITICAL UNION, WITH
THEIR PURPOSE NO MORE THAN TO SEEK TO DEFINE COMMON ATTITUDES, THEY
ARE TOLD THAT THEYMUST CONSULT WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE,
THAT IS A BAD SITUATION. HE SAID ONE MUST ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCE
OF WHAT ONE WANTS TO ACHIEVE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE

EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF THE
NINE. HE SAID IF THERE IS TO BE UNION BY 1980, THEN THERE WILL
HAVE TO BE POLITICAL DECISIONS UNDER SOME FORM.

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5344
SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

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LIMDIS

12. LUNS IMMEDIATELY POKED A HOLE IN THIS LOGIC. THE DIFFICULTY, HE SAID, IS NOT THAT OTHERS OPPOSE THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL ENTITY OF THE NINE. RATHER THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS SUCH GREAT DIFFICULTY AMONG THE NINE IN GETTING A DECISION. HE SAID THAT IN THE FIFTEEN, IF COUNTRIES COME IN WITH THEIR VIEWS, AND ONE OR TWO COUNTRES FIND THEMSELVES ISOLATED, THEY HAVE TO BEND TO THE CONSENSUS, BUT IT IS SUCH A TORTUOUS PROCESS FOR THE NINE TO REACH A CONCLUSION, THAT ONCE IT IS ACHIEVED THEY DON'T FEEL THEY CAN ALTER THEIR POSITION.

13. PICKING UP THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT, I SAID THAT WHEN I SENSE A NORMAL, BUREAUCRATIC RELUCTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES GOVT, OF THE SORT THAT I AM SURE EXISTS IN OTHER GOVTS, TO REFRAIN FROM DISCUSSION ON A GIVEN SUBJECT OUTSIDE OF THE GOVT UNTIL A DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED, I SOMETIMES FIND IT USEFUL TO TELL MY PEOPLE THAT THE PROCESS OF CONSULTING HERE IN THE ALLIANCE, EVEN DURING A PRELIMINARY STAGE, IS OFTEN BENEFICIAL. SOMETIMES, ONE ACTUALLY LEARNS SOMETHING SUBSTANTIVELY FROM CONSULTATIONS. AT THE VERY MIMIMUM, YOU WILL BETTER UNDERSTAND THE PERSPECTIVES OF
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OTHERS. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME OFTEN USEFUL TO TEST THEORIES IN A MARKET PLACE OF COMPETITIVE IDEAS. FREQUENTLY FROM THAT PROCESS COMES A BETTER APPROACH, A BETTER POLICY, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SOMETIMES IT DOESN'T SEEM AS TIDY, AS NEAT, NOR AS CONTORLLABLE.

14. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT AS WE TALKED ABOUT THIS MATTER TO APPRECIATE THAT WHAT HELPS THE NINE IN THEIR EFFORT, AND WHAT MIGHT HURT THEM, IS IMPORTANT TO THE FIFTEEN. EVEN MORE

OBVIOUS IS THE FACT THAT WHAT HELPS AND HURTS THE FIFTEEN IS IMPORTANT TO THE NINE, SINCE EIGHT OF THE NINE ARE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTEEN, AND IT AFFECTS THEIR BASIC SECURITY. I SAID I SAW NOTHING INCOMPATIBLE BETWEEN REAL SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NINE AND THE INTEREST OF THE FIFTEEN, ALTHOUGH ONE COULD EASILY

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POSE THE CONSULTATION QUESTION IN A WAY WHICH MADE IT APPEAR THAT THERE WAS A CONFLICT OR THAT SUCH CONSULTATION WAS EITHER NOT NECESSARY

(I.E. BECAUSE NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN TAKEN, OR AN OUTRAGEOUS INFRINGEMENT ON INTERNAL MATTERS (I.E. BY CONFUSING OR BEING IMPRECISE ABOUT
WHAT IS TO BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION).

15. THE ANALYSIS THAT LUNS HAD MADE, I SAID, SEEMED TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION WELL. THERE IS A PROBLEM FOR THE ALLIANCE, IN THAT ONCE THE NINE ACHIEVE A COMMON POSITION AFTER A GOOD DEAL OF PAINFUL WORK, THEY ARE REALLY NOT IN A POSITION TO CHANGE IT; THEREFORE, THE REMAINING SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE FACED WITH A CONCLUSION BY EIGHT OF ITS MEMBERS THAT REALLY CANNOT BE CHANGED. THIS IS A DEPARTURE FROM THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE FIFTEEN, WHERE A CONSENSUS-SEEKING PROCESS IS THE RULE. CONVERSELY, THERE IS A PROBLEM FOR THE NINE, IN THAT THEY FEEL IT IS SO DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO REACH A DECISION ON ANYTHING THAT IF THEY HAD TO CONSULT BEFORE A DECISION WAS REACHED, NO DECISION WOULD EVER BE REACHED. FROM THE NINE'S POINT OF VIEW, OPERATING ON CONSENSUS WITHIN THE NINE AS THEY DO, A FURTHER COMPLICATION IN WHAT IS ALREADY A VERY DIFFICULT JOB THEY FEEL MIGHT BE TANTAMOUNT TO PREVENTING THEM FROM EVER REACHING A COMMON POSITION AND THUS PREVENTING THEIR DEVELOPMENT INTO A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENTITY.

16. I SAID I THOUGHT OF THIS DILEMMA IN THE TERMS OF A BALANCE
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SHEET. ON THE ONE HAND, WE HAD TO THINK ABOUT WHAT THE 9 AND THE 15 WERE GAINING ON BEHALF OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE NINE, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND WE HAD TO WEIGH THAT AGAINST WHAT WE WERE LOSING, OR STOOD TO LOSE, IN TERMS OF SOMETHING THAT IS IMPORTANT TO BOTH THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN, NAMELY THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP AND THE ALLIANCE THAT EXISTS. I THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO BE CONSTANTLY ADDING UP WHAT IS GAINED AND WHAT WE ARE LOSING IN EXCHANGE, AND TRY TO MAKE SURE THAT WE STAY ON THE PLUS SIDE. IN CONCLUSION, I SAID THE ONLY WAY THAT COULD REALLY EFFECTIVELY BE DONE WOULD BE TO ASK CONTINUALLY THE QUESTION--WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF OUR ACTIONS?

17. CHORAFAS (GREECE) SAID HIS COUNTRY WAS HOPEFUL MORE WOULD BE DONE IN THE ALLIANCE. CATALANO (ITALY) ADDED THAT ITALY WAS HOPING FOR A SINGLE VOICE BY 1980, AND WHILE IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT COMMUNICATION COULD BE IMPROVED, HE FEARED THAT UNTIL THERE IS ONE VOICE FOR THE NINE, ALL THE FIFTEEN WILL HAVE TO SUFFER WITH THE NINE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE TOUGHT THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN HAD CONSULTED WELL ON CSCE. THE NINE HAD REACHED DECISIONS AND MOST OF THOSE DECISIONS WERE ACCEPTED BY THE FIFTEEN, EXCEPT FOR PERHAPS TEN PERCENT OF THE INSTANCES WHERE THE NINE HAD CHANGED THEIR POSITION. CATALANO CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT WE HAD TO RESIGN OURSELVES TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT UNTIL THERE IS ONE VOICE FOR THE NINE THERE WILL BE

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DIFFICULTIES. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY, IN USING THE CSCE EXAMPLE HE IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE 9 USED STAFF WORK FROM THE 15 TO DEVELOP THEIR POSITIONS AND SECONDLY, THAT BECAUSE THE SUBJECTS WERE NOT OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE THE US WAS NOT DEEPLY INVOLVED.

18. PURSUING A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT POINT, MENZIES SAID THAT THERE MAY BE SOME SUBJECTS THAT THE US AND THE NINE FEEL THEY SHOULD DISCUSS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. HE SAID THE US IS A GREAT POWER AND THE EC IS A GREAT POWER IN THE MAKING. BOTH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE FIFTEEN. ALL ARE TOUCHED BY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND THE NINE. FOR SEVERAL REASONS HE HOPED THAT, IF US-NINE CONSULTATIONS ARE TO BE INSTITUTIONALIZED, WHICH HE BELIEVED WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE, AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF THAT INSTITUTIONALIZATION WILL BE IN THE NATO FORUM. THIS WOULD AVOID ANY ELABORATE NEW INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS BETWEEN THE US AND THE NINE, IT WOULD SAVE DUPLICATION, BUT EVEN MORE IT

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WOULD SAVE THE ALLIANCE. NATO IS THE BEST PLACE BECAUSE THE SIX OTHER ALLIES ARE SO INTIMATELY AND INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND THE NINE.

19. THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH DE ROSE'S COMMENT THAT THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN AN EXCELLENT ONE, AND THAT HE FELT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO APPROACH THIS PROBLEM, NOT IN THE SPIRIT OF CONTEST BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF TRYING TO FIND A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION. RUMSFELD

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